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Conserving Biodiversity on Private Land
David Farrlerl
The Biodiversity Convention
The United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity entered into force on December
29, 1993, upon ratification by thirty countries, including Australia. The United States
is a signatory, but has not yet ratified. Most of the interest in the Convention has
focused on those provisions which attempt to resolve the differences between
developed and developing countries about access to genetic resources within
developing countries for commercial purposes, and reciprocal access by developing
countries to the resulting technology. Far less attention has been given to the extensive
provisions which require all countries, including Australia and the United States, to
take measures to conserve their own biodiversity.
These include obligations "as far as possible and appropriate" to:
•"regulate or manage biological resources (including genetic resources and
populations} important for the conservation of biological diversity whether
within or outside protected areas, with a view to ensuring their conservation
and sustainable use";2
•identify types of activities likely to have significant adverse impacts on the
conservation of biodiversity, monitor the effects of these activities and
"regulate or manage" them;3
•adopt "economically and socially sound measures that act as incentives"
for the conservation of biodiversity.4
The first point to note here is that these obligations relate not only to the conservation
of diversity between species, but also to genetic diversity (diversity within species) and
ecosystem diversity. Legislative initiatives which focus on endangered species will not
suffice. Secondly, the Convention is concerned with the hard values of biodiversity as
a "resource" for human use, as distinct from the soft values historically associated with
the concept of nature conservation. Although, in these terms, the immediate value of
biodiversity is diminished because of our lack of knowledge about many of its potential
uses, it is necessarily enhanced by the fact that its destruction is irreversible. Thirdly,
these obligations under the Convention require action to be taken not only through the
creation and management of protected areas, such as national parks and nature reserves,
but also on privately owned land. Fourthly, both the Australian and United States
Governments will have no choice but to identify ecosystem destruction through
agricultural activities and real estate developme~t on privately owned land as activities
having significant adverse impacts on the conservation of biodiversity. The obligation
is then to "regulate or manage" both the activities and the biological resources which
they destroy. Fifthly, within the unsatisfactory disjunction drawn between regulation
I visiting Fellow. Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado, 1994; Co-Director of the
Centre for Natural Resources Law and Policy, and Professor of Law, University of Wollongong, New
South Wales, Australia. A fuller version of the research discussed here is to appear in 19 Harvard
Environmental Law Revi.ew (1995). I would like to thank the staff of the Natural Resources Law
Center for the hospitality and assistance which made this research possible. In panicular I would like
to thank Lany MacDonnell of the Natural Resources Law Center and Dan Rohlf of Nonhwestem
School of Law, Lewis and Clark College for commenting on the broad ideas eltpressed, Will Mum1y,
Director, Conservation Programs, Western Regional Office, The Nature Conservancy for the elttensive
assistance be gave in relation to the work carried out by the Conservancy, and my research assistant,
Rob Rogers, whose broad familiarity with many of the issues. and detailed research. were invaluable.
2Anicle8(c).
3Anicles 7(c) and 8(1).
4Article 11.
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and management, and the reference to incentives, there is the kernel of a recognition
that command and control regulation alone is unlikely to be adequate. We are also
going to have to look towards developing financial inducements, particularly when we
move beyond restrictions on private land use to ongoing management of the land. .

The inadequacy of land in public ownership
The increasing significance of privately owned land in any comprehensive strategy
designed to address the issue of biodiversity conservation is implicit in the writings of
conservation biologists. There are two prominent messages for the policy analyst in this
literature.
-· •E~isting areas of publicly owned land are currently not adequate when it
· comes to conservation of representative ecosystems.
The reasons for this are both historical· and political. Land has been reserved or
acquired on an ad hoc basis, with political factors pmaying a significant role and other
objectives, such as recreation, competing with nature conservation in determining the
precise areas to be set aside.S Although some conservation biologists remain confident
that in the future we can remedy this situation by careful selection of areas to address
gaps in coverage, the fact that unrepresented ecosystems are often located in fragments
on privately owned land means that management by a cenaalized agency will be
difficult. Apart from this, it will take a good degree of political will to purchase land
compulsorily, if landholders refuse to go along with attempts to persuade them to part
with their land voluntarily.
Where ecosystems have been set aside on public land. there is increasing concern that
nature conservation is being compromised by other management objectives, such as
recreation. grazing and timber production.6 This is hardly surprising, given the fact
that for most public land designations, nature conservation is either only one of a
number of competing objectives identified by legislation, or is specifically given a
lower priority. Even where land is ostensibly being managed for purposes of nature
conservation, management may be influenced by competing considerations. as where a
"hands orr· management regime allows certain species popular with tourists or hunters
to thrive in the absence of predators which have long since been driven out, producing
fundamental distortions in ecosystems.'
•Even if existing areas of publicly owned land, and those to be acquired in
the near fu ture, adequately re~resented ecosystems, we can no longer rely
on a ghetto approach to biOdiversity conservation, but must move
increasingly towards managing for biodiversity conservation on a landscape
level, regardless of the tenure in which land is held.8
There are a number of themes here. Where ecosystems are represented on public land,
the areas protected may not be large enough to maintain minimum viable populations of

Ssee the review of the literature by RL Pressey, Ad Hoc Reservations: Forward or Backward Steps in
Developing Representative Reserve Systems?, 8 CONSERV. BIOL. 662 (1994).
6for a critical analysis of policies and practices of agencies in relation to biodiversity conservation on
Federal lands under their control. see KEYSTONE CENTER, BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY ON
FEDERAL LANDS, REPORT OF A KEYSTONE POUCY DIALOGUE (Keystone Cemer, 1991). .
7A. CHASE, PLAYING GOD IN YELLOWSTONE: THE DESTRUCTION OF AMERICA'S FIRST
NATIONAL PARK chapters 6-8 (Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986), discussing the application of the
theory of "natural regulation" to ellc management in the 1970s.
8nenis A. Saunders, Richard I. Hobbs and Chris R. Margules, Biological Consequences of Ecosystem
Fragmentation: A Review, 5 CONSERV. BIOL 18 (1991); Reed F. Noss. A Regiorwl LAndscape
Approach to Maintain Biodiversity, 33 BIOSCIENCE 700 (1983).
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wide ranging venebrate species of large carnivores and herbivores in the longer tenn.9
At the very least, there will have to be conidors over land in private ownership linking
areas of protected land together, to allow species to migrate between them. Connecting
corridors must also be provided when ecosystems are now found only in vegetation
fragments, too small to suppon even minimum viable populations of smaller species.
Beyond this, however, effective management of. remnant vegetation will have
substantial implications for the way in which land in commercial production
surrounding it is managed. Where small remnants are involved, some literature
suggests that management should be directed primarily at controlling external
influences, I 0 in contrast to traditional reserve management which stops at reserve
boundaries. This demands integrated landscape management, based on cooperation
with neighbouring landholders. It requires us to think in tenns of conservation
networks, where land managers, including private landholders, cooperate to conserve
biodiversity.ll
Even large protected ecosystems in public ownership will always be vulnerable to edge
effects stemming from increased radiation loads and other spillovers from surrounding
areas, unless substantial buffers are provided. These will frequently have to be on land
in private ownership. The concept of a biosphere reserve, which originated in the
UNESCO Man and the Biosphere Program, may be helpful in this context. This
comprises a core conservation area of minimally disturbed and strictly protected
ecosystems, a buffer zone around the core designed to protect it, while allowing cenain
kinds of resource use, and a transition area extending outwards from all directions,
within which the full range of human resource use occurs.l2
The provision of buffer zones around core areas and wildlife corridors connecting
them, may, however, be a futile gesture in the longer tenn. There is increasing
evidence that global warming will have dramatic effects on ecosystem boundaries as the
relative speed of temperature shifts in comparison with changes in the past, leaving
vegetation with insufficient time to adapt 13 Because trees are long-lived and take a
long time to reproduce, it is not easy for them to adjust quickly to change, although
reproduction failure may not become apparent for many decades. Mobile animal
species will find it easier to respond, provided that food sources are available and there
are no human barriers blocking migration. In the words of Nonnan Myers, where
there are such barriers, "[w]hat was once a sanctuary will become a trap". The
implication of global warming is that we can no longer take a segmental approach to
biodiversity conservation, with nature conservation ghettos interspersed within a
landscape devoted to commercial production.
Others have argued that we need to cut our losses and to spend more ~ on those
species which show some ability to tolerate and adjust to human agricultural land use,
as distinct from the current focus on fragments of remnant habitat and species which are
on their last legs anyway. We may do better to diven scarce management resources
~Edward Grumbine, Viable Populations, Reservt Size, and FtiUral Lands Management: A Critique,
4 CONSERV. BJOL. 127, 129 (1990).
lOKEYSTONE CENTER, BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY ON FEDERAL LANDS, REPORT OF A
KEYSTONE POLICY DIALOGUE 63 (Keystone Center, 1991).
.
llReed F. Noss, Protecting Natural Areas in Fragmented Lmtdscapes, 2 NATIJRAL AREAS
JOURNAL 2 (1987); Hal Salwasser, Christine Schonewald·Cox and Richard Baker. The Role of
Interagency Cooperation in Managing for Viable Populations. in VIABLE POPULATIONS 147 (M.
E. Soult ed., 1987).
12Michael Balisse, Developing and Focusing the Bio.Jphere Ruerve Concept, 22 NA1URE AND
RESOURCES 1 (1986); Reed F. Noss and Lany D. Harris, NoiUs. Networks, and MUMs: Preserving
Di'vtfsity tU All Scales, 10 ENVTI.. MGMT. 299, 303-307 (1986).
13Norman Myers, Questions of Mass Extinction, 2 BIODIVERSITY AND CONSERVATION 2
(1993).
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away, for example, from expensive reafforestation exercises designed to restore species
which arc unable to tolerate human modification of habitat, towards the active
management of the variegated landscape, by providing for a range of grazing,
disturbance and fertilization regimes.14 Once again, the argument is that we need to
move away from our obsession with reserves as isolated ghettos, and to look more
closely at conservation on private land.·
The upshot of these different perspectives is the need for societies to devise ways and
means of modifying the behaviour of private landholders. It is with these ways and
means - policy instruments - that I am concerned. For market forces generally provide
private landholders with little incentive to conserve biodiversity, and where market
incentives do exist, such as hunting or recreation, they may produce distortions in the
way in which ecosystems are managed and end up actually diminishing diversity.
Conservation by consensus under the Farm BiJ1sl5
One approach is for goyernments to operate in the market place themselves, not by
purchasing title to land but by purchasing land use restrictions designed to conserve
biodiversity. These can take the form either of simple contractual agreements, or
conservation easements which will bind all who obtain title to the land in the future.
There are a number of examples of such schemes in the United States. The
Environmental Conservation Acreage Reserve Program (ECARP) under the Farm Bills
consists of the conservation reserve program (CRP) and the wetland reserve program
(WRP). The CRP is by far the most significant government commitment to
environmental programs in terms of resource allocation. Over 36,400 acres were
enrolled in the first twelve sign-ups, representing a total financial commitment by the
Federal Government of over $19.5 billion, and an annual commitment peaking at $1.9
billion in 1996. In Colorado there are 6,207 contracts covering nearly 2 million acres
and involving a total financial commitment of nearly $1 billion. The largest CRP
contract of all in financial terms is in Lincoln County, paying $5.6 million for 11,815
acres.16
The origins of the CRP lie in concerns about the overproduction of certain agriculturnl
commodities and land degradation. It is only after 1990, with the expansion of eligible
categories of land beyond hiyhly erodible cropland to include croplands to be devoted
to permanent wildlife habitat 7 that the program has become marginally more sensitive
to the demands of biodiversity conservation, albeit perceived narrowly in terms of
"wildlife" conservation.
The CRP is essentially a short-term land retirement program, and significant problems
are anticipated when the first batches of enrolled land comes out of contract in 1995. It
relies primarily on more vulnerable contracts, rather than easements. These are
ordinarily for a period of ten years, although this can be extended to a period specified
by the landholder of up to fifteen years where the land is devoted to hardwood trees,
shelterbelts, windbreaks, or wildlife corridors. IS Under the terms of the CRP
contract, an approved conservation plan must be implemented, and this may include a
requirement for the establishment of permanent wildlife habitat.l9 The original
14s. Mcintyre and G. W. Barrett, Habitat Variegation. An Alternative to Fragmentation. 6
CONSERV. BIOL. 146 (1992).
lSFood Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198. 99 StaL 1354; Food, Agriculture, Conservation
and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No 101-624, 104 StaL 3359.
16K.ENNETH A. COOK, SO LONG CRP (Environmenlal Working Group, 1994), 4·5, 18, 22.
1716 U.S.C. § 3831(b)(4)(C) (Supp. V 1993); 7 C.F.R. § 1410.103(d)(2) (1994).
1816 U.S.C. § 3831(e) (Supp. V 1993); 7 C.F.R. § 1410.104 (1994).
19t6 U.S.C. § 3832(a) (Supp. V 1993); 7 C.F.R. §§ 1410.111, 1410.112(a)(l) (1994).
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position was that land taken into the CRP after 1990 on the grounds that it was to be
devoted to permanent wildlife habitat, as distinct from being highly erodible, had to be
made subject to a useful life easement (defined as being for either 15 or 30 years) even
though rental payments were only to be made for the first ten years. Because this acted
as a disincentive to enrolment in the Program, the requirement was dropped in 1992.20
although landholders are required under the contract to maintain the practice for its
useful life. This will not, however, guarantee the permanency of the practice where the
land changes hands.
The CRP suffers from all the shortcomings of a program which has had tacked on to it
a thin veneer of concern with wildlife conservation, after staning out its life with very
different objectives. The Wetlands Reserve Program, on the other hand, is more
directly relevant to biodiversity conservation, although its impact is confined to a
narrow category of ecosystems. The WRP is concerned with restoring to their original
condition wetlands which have been modified by agricultural activity or completely
converted, before December 23, 1985.21 The likelihood and cost of restoration must
be taken into consideration in deciding which areas to enrot.22 The owner of the land
must be prepared to grant a perpetual or 30 year easement, or for the maximum duration
allowed by State law.23 Priority is to be given to easements based on the value which
they have for protecting and enhancing habitat for migratory birds and other wildlife.24
The focus of the CRP and the WRP is on converting existing intensive land uses to
more environmentally sensitive uses by restoring land already in agricultural
production, rather than seeking to dissuade landholders from converting land to more
intensive uses in the first place. There is a powerful argument that, when it comes to
biodiversity conservation, we would do better to concentrate limited resources on
conserving relatively undisturbed land rather than attempting to restore degraded or
even destroyed ecosystems. The retention of relatively undisturbed areas is addressed
by the Sodbuster and Swampbuster provisions of the Farm Bill. Sodbuster threatens
farmers with loss of agricultural program benefits where any agricultural commodity is
produced "on a field on which highly erodible land is predominate", unless this is in
accordance with an approved conservation plan.25 The focus here is squarely on the
prevention of land degradation (land conservation) rather than the conservation of
biodiversity. The operating assumption is that highly erodible land can be brought into
production, with biodiversity substantially destroyed in the process, as long as there is
a conservation plan in place, designed to conserve the land base rather than its
biodiversity. The much greater sensitivity of Swampbuster towards biodiversity
conservation stems from the fact that there is no equivalent to the conservation plan
exemption. Swampbuster also threatens landholders with loss of program benefits, the
relevant event here being conversion of a wetland "for the purpose, or to have the
effect, of making the production of an agricultural commodity possible".26 The issue
is whether destructive activities, such as clearing and draining, have made the
production of an agricultural commodity possible, not whether there is an intention to
do so, or whether it is in fact ever done.

20J>ub L. No. 102·324 § l(a), July 22, 1992, 106 Stat. 447 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
3831(b)(4)(C) (Supp. V 1993)); 58 Fed. Reg. 4064 (1993) (codified as amended at 7 C.F.R. §
1410.103{d)(2) (1994)).
2116 U.S.C. § 3837(c)(1) (Supp. V 1993); 7 C.F.R. § 703.7(a)(1)(i) (1994).
22a6 U.S.C. § 3837(c)(2) (Supp. V 1993); 7 C.F.R. §§ 703.2{1)(1), 703.7(aX1Xii), 703.7(e) (1994).
2316 U.S.C. §§ 3837a(a), 3837a(e) (Supp. V 1993).
2416 U.S.C. § 3837c(d) {Supp. V 1993).
2516 U.S.C. §§ 3811, 3812(c)(l) {1988 & Supp. V 1993); 7 C.F.R. § 12.S{a)(2)(ii) {1994).
26t6 U.S.C. § 382l(b) (Supp. V 1993).
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Nevenheless, Swampbuster, has fundamental shortcomings, which are shared equally
by Sodbuster. In the first place, it has nothing to say to those converting wetland for
purposes other than cropping. While a landholder may be discouraged from converting
wetland from cropping by the threat of loss of program benefits, only the command and
control provisions of section 404 of the Clean Water Act (see below) stand in the way
of the same landholder selling the same land for real estate development, or putting it to
pasture and destroying much of its biodiversity value in the process. The me~ge that
comes out of Swampbuster is not "don't develop wetlands", but "don't develop them
for particular purposes", ultimately betraying its origins as a device for limiting
agricultural production. Secondly, to the extent that landholders do not grow program
crops or are prepared to forego program benefits, Swampbuster has no hold over them.
Thirdly,~f we look carefully at Swampbuster, what we should see beneath the rhetoric
of command and control is the reality of an entirely voluntary program, offering
program benefits on certain conditions, including the conservation of biodiversity in
some areas. But this is not how landholders perceive it. It presents to landholders,
accustomed to receiving program benefits and dependent upon them, as command and
control regulation. The way in which the legislation is drafted reinforces the message
that landholders will be punished if they are not sensitive to certain environmental
concerns. The result is that Swampbuster has many of the disadvantages associated
with command and control regulation, particularly landholder hostility and enforcement
problems, and few of the advantages possessed by policy instruments which offer
carrots rather than beat with sticks.
Finally, the imposition of restrictions on land use, such as those which exist under
Swampbuster, only go part way towards addressing the issue of biodiversity
conservatiqn. In many situations, particularly where the area concerned is small,
ongoing management of the land in relation to surrounding areas is likely to be crucial.
Neither the Sodbuster nor Swampbuster provisions allow for the payment of incentives
to landholders for ongoing management of ecosystems, even though fragments of
relatively undisturbed vegetation may be as much in need of management as areas
which have been restored. Both the CRP and the WRP, as well as offering
compensation, provide for cost share in relation to the initial establishment of
conservation measures. However, management payments are not contemplated under
the CRP, except where land is to be set-aside for the production of hardwood trees,
windbreaks, shelterbelts or wildlife corridors, when payments for maintenance can be
made.27 Only the WRP requires landholders to make long-term commitments in
easements to manage restored wetlands in accordance with a conservation plan,28 but
the regulations make it clear that cost-share payments for ongoing management, as
distinct from initial restoration, will be exceptionat.29

Conservation through private agreement
Apart from government initiatives designed to influence land use through voluntary
agreements with private landholders, activities on a growing area of land in the United
States are regulated through agreements reached between landholders and private
nonprofit organizations, such as the Nature Conservancy and land trusts. Legal
requirements for a valid conservation easement vary from state to state. For present
purposes, however, it can be taken as an agreement regarding land use, designed to
protect natural resources, binding not only on the original landholder who agrees to the
·
obligations, but also those who hold title to the land thereafter.30

27 16 U.S.C. § 3834(b) (Supp. V 1993); 7 C.F.R. § 1410.118 (1994).
2816 U.S.C. § 3837a(a)-{c) (Supp. V 1993); 7 C.F.R. §§ 703.12(aX:1Xii), 703.12(a)(l5) (1994).
2916 U.S.C. § 3837c(a) (Supp. V 1993); 7 C.F.R. §§ 703.13(a)(4), 703.13(b) (1994).
30see, for example, the Uniform Conservation Easement Act of 1981, 12 UL.A. 66.
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Allowing conservation easements to be held by publicly non-accountable private
organizations is said to conflict with the policy agamst dead hand tics on land, which
demands that landholders should be able to shift land uses according to current market
choices.31 This ignores the fact that development places a frequently iJTeversible dead
hand tie on land, by substantially confining the uses to which it can be put through
physical modification of the land by degradation and destruction of ecosystems. Those
who restrict development through easements actually keep open options for future
generations, the reality always being that future law-makers cannot be bound by prior
legal arrangements. Unlike physical modification, these are always reversible.
Besides, private organizations can always place a dead hand on land by outright
purchase of the fee simple.
On the other hand, the number of land trusts, with their disparate objectives,32 taking
conservation easements on an ad hoc basis, creates difficulties for any attempt to
produce integrated and coordinated planning in this area. At present the only means by
which these arrangements are made publicly accountable is through the tax system.
Yet, many of them are being substantially paid for by public funds in the form of
foregone taxes.33 Land management objectives adopted by a panicular trust may
conflict with desirable land use from a public interest perspective. For example, an
easement may be taken over land in order to gain or maintain public access, or even to
preserve it as fann land, when the public interest could require restrictions on access,
and restoration of ecosystems. Ultimately this could lead to conflicts between
assumptions underpinning panicular conservation easements and genc:ral obligations
arising under command and control regulation, such as the Endangered Species Act or
section 404 of the Clean Water Act.
In addition_to adequate advance planning, provision for ongoing management of the
land is another crucial issue. The imposition of land use restrictions is only the ftrSt
step towards biodiversity conservation: especially where ecosystems comprise
fragmentS, active management is required, panicularly in relation to external impactS. It
is entirely misleading to advance as one of the advantages of a strategy based on
conservation easements, the argument that the landholder remains responsible for
ongoing management, unless steps are taken in the agreement to clarify what
management involves. The reality is that except in those limited situations where
management for biodiversity conservation is compatible with productive activity, such
as limited grazing, the land will not be managed in an appropriate manner unless the
body taking the easement reserves access to the land and takes management
responsibility itself, or unless the landholder agrees to do this and is paid for doing so.
There is an argument that by handing over ongoing management responsibility to
landholders we not only acknowledge their possession of a certain level of knowledge,
but also provide them with a continuing stake in biodiversity conservation, initially
through management payments, but in the longer term through association with the
management process and developing expertise. Yet the Handbooks produced by the
Land Trust Alliance emphasise the restrictive role of conservation easements, and do
not appear to countenance substantial management obligations resting with either the

31Tbe case for and against allowing private, as distinct from public, organizations to enter into
arrangements with private landholders which will bind future generations, has been well rehearsed by
Genlld Komgold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the Contut of in
Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 433 {1984).
32See generally, JOHN B. WRIGHT, ROCKY MOUNTAIN DIVIDE: SELLING AND SAVING lHE
WEST (University of Texas, Press 1993}.
33A detailed consideration of the relevant talt law is beyond the scope of the present paper. The basic
position is that the grant of an easement to a qualified organization exclusively for conservation
purposes can be deducted as a charitable deduction for income tax purposes: J.R.C. §§ 170(f)(3)(B}(iii)
and 170(h) (1988 & Supp. V 1~3); Treas. Reg.§ 1.170A-14 (1994).
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easement holder or the landowner.34 There is a danger that particular land trusts may
end up focusing on getting land under conservation easement, with little attention paid
to continuing stewardship responsibilities. Apart from this, small organizations will
simply not have the expenise to set up and implement the detailed monitoring and
management mechanisms required to promote biodiversity conservation.
Finally there is the matter of enforcement Land trusts emphasize the voluntary nature
of a strategy based on conservation easements. Formal legal proceedings are seen very
much as a last resort The fact that a program starts out life in the realm of consensus,
however, does not mean that at a later point it may not confront the landholder as
coercion. . This becomes increasingly likely where the landholder who originally
granted a·conservation easement sells the land. Handbooks dealing with conservation
easements emphasize the crucial imponance of not neglecting the question of
enforcement, both in terms of the initial drafting of the easement, and the setting aside
of funds for monitoring and enforcement.35 In practice, however, enforcement is
likely to present a major problem. The Nature Conservancy emphasizes that if the issue
comes up, it is already too late because the damage has been done, and restoration is
extremely difficult or impossible. Although easements are monitored, this is usually
only possible on an annual basis, and the main emphasis is placed on maintaining good
relationships with landholders to forestall easement transgressions.36
The Nature Conservancy is in a special position because of its size and levels of
expenise and the fact that its conservation easement program is squarely committed to
the conservation of biodiversity. It currently holds nearly 600 conservation easements,
generally designed to protect endangered species and natural communities which occur
on privately owned land.37 Unlike the CRP and the WRP, which focus on restoring
land degraded by cultivation, the Conservancy concentrates its efforts on protecting
areas which currently provide habitat for rare species, as well as natural communities
(plant associations/assemblages). These areas are identified by using information from
the Conservancy's Natural Heritage Programs· elaborate inventories of the biological
and ecological features of a particular region - and selected for protection by an
elaborate ranking system.38 The primary aim of easements is to protect land from
development pressures which will degrade or destroy existing ecosystems. To this
extent, the approach has some similarities with the Sodbuster and Swampbuster
programs under the Farm Bill, but unlike them, it is not restricted to reducing the threat
of intensified agricultural land use. Easements are panicularly concerned to restrict real
estate development. In theory, there is no reason why attempts should not be made to
negotiate restrictions on existing agricultural uses, such as grazing. In practice, it is
relatively rare that the Conservancy manages to secure an agreement on fencing river
banks or committing the landholder to a panicular grazing regime. While conservation
easements reserve a right of entry to the Conservancy to monitor ecosystems and
compliance with the terms of the agreement, the issue of management arrangements
34For exrunple, BRENDA LIND, TifE CONSERVATION EASEMENT STEWARDSHIP GUIDE:
DESIGNING, MONITORING, AND ENFORCING EASEMENTS 8 (1991). In some states, !here
may be a legal obstacle because enabling legislation only contemplates the imposition of land use
restrictions, but this is not the case in chose states which have adopted a version of the Unifonn
Consezvation Easement Act.
3SJANET DIEHL AND THOMAS S. BARRETI, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT
HANDBOOK: MANAOING LAND CONSERVATION AND HISTORIC PRESERVATION
EASEMENT PROGRAMS (1988).
36cortespondence with Will Murray, Director, Conservation Programs, Western Regional Office, The
Nature Conservancy (June 28, 1994).
37conespondence with Will Murray, Director, Conservation Programs, Western Regional Office, The
Nature Conservancy (May 18, 1994).
38PERSPEcrJVES ON SPECIES IMPERILMENT, A REPORT FROM THE NATURAL
HERITAGE DATA CEN'rnR NE'IWORK (Nature Conservancy, Revised Printing,1993).

9
will generally be left to be negotiated on an ad hoc basis. The more active the
management required, the more likely the Conservancy will be to purchase title to the
- land, as distinct from an easement.39
.
A private organization su.ch as the Conservancy has the unique advantage of being able
to negotiat.e with private landholders against the backdrop of government regulation,
while still remaining committed to a philosophy of voluntariness and cooperation. The
existence of command and control legislation, such as the Endangered Species Act,
may, for example, play a vital role in bringing landholders to the bargaining table. By
contrast, government will never be able to escape completely from beihg perceived in
tenns of its regulatory persona even where it approaches with offerings rather than
threats. Currently, therefore, Nature Conservancy activities on private land provide a
valuable adjunct to government initiatives. It is important to recognize, however, that
they are precisely this- an adjunct to government initiatives. For significant difficulties
exist which go to the root of any program which ultimately leaves the decision on
whether to participate with the individual landholder. Ecosystems cut across property
boundaries. Remnants are scattered across the landscape. By refusing to cooperate,
one person with a strategic landholding can effectively destroy a wildlife comdor or
leave a destructive gap in a buffer zone. Even those who are prepared to negotiate may
hold out for more than an organization is prepared to pay. These difficulties are
enhanced where the policy is to rely primarily on gifts of easements from those seeking
tax benefits, rather than purchase.
For those who will not cooperate with voluntary initiatives, there wiU have to be a
regulatory fall· back position. Apart from this, it is quite unli.lcely that there will ever be
enough resources either from private of public sources to enable the demand for
biodiversity conservation to be met through free market solutions. It remains crucial
that regulations continue to set the parameters within which negotiations are conducted
and bargains reached, and that they take a form which ensures that the focus of those
negotiations goes beyond retention of natural areas and addresses the question of
management.

The command and control alternative
In the United States, so-called "command and contrOl" strategies have been extensively
used by the Federal Government in areas relevant to biodiversity conservation on
private land. Both the "take" provisions of section 9 of the Endangered Species Act,
and the wetlands protection provisions of section 404 of the Clean Water Act set up
regulatory systems based on command and control. These combine a broad prohibition
backed up by a range of sanctions, the overall impact of which is substantially softened
by pennitted exceptions, available on a case by case basis.
Under the Clean Water Act, it is unlawful to "discharge ... dredged or fill material" into
"navigable waters" without a permit. The Corps of Engineers has the primary
responsibility for issuing permits, but in doing so, it is required to apply Guidelines
developed by the EPA in conjunction with the Corps. On top of this, the EPA has a
power of veto over the grant of pennits.40
The EPA has attempted to develop section 404 as a tool for achieving biodiversity
conservation on private land, and this becomes apparent in the detailed provisions· of
the Guidelines, which are based on a broad ecosystem conservation perspective.4 1
Against consistent resistance from the Corps, the EPA has striven to have the
ostensibly narrow wording of the prohibition interpreted generously so as to expand
39Jnterview with Will Murray. Director, Conservation Programs, Western Regional Office, The Nature
Conservancy, in Boulder, Co., (May 9, 1994).
40J3 U.S.C. §§ l3ll(a), 1344 (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 231 (1993)
4140 C.F.R. § 230.11(e) (1993). .

10
both the areas and the types of activity covered. More recently it has met with
considerable success in terms of extending the range of activities regulated. Under
rules promulgated in August 1993, currently subject to legal challenge,42 the essential
position is that, apart from an exception for normal farming, silviculture, and ranching
activities which do not involve conversion of wetlands to a new use, any land
degrading activities which stir up the surface of wetlands and move it around will
constitute a prohibited discharge of dredged material, even if this involves no more than
soil and sediment from the roots of an uprooted tree falling to the ground.43 This will
cover, for example, such activities as mechanized landclearing, ditching and
channelization. It does not cover the cutting or removing of vegetation above the
ground, :and this is a significant drawback from the perspective of biodiversity
conservation, but it is nevenheless expansive.
So far as the range of areas covered is concerned, recent experience has been more
mixed. On the one hand, it is increasingly accepted that this includes not only areas
adjacent to rivers,44 but also many so-called non-adjacent or isolated wetlands, such as
prairie potholes, vernal pools and playa lakes, if it is proved that they represent
potential habitat for migratory birds.45 On the other hand, under a recent rule, section
404 no longer applies to 53 million acres46 of wetland which was convened to
cropping before December 23, 1985, and is regarded as having lost its wetland
characteristics.47 This is to be distinguished from "farmed wetland", which although
modified to allow cropping, still retains such wetland characteristics.
The direct relevance of the Endangered Species Act to private landholders stems from
the fact that section 9 makes it unlawful to "take" a species of fish or wildlife listed as
endangered or threatened, anywhere in the USA, unless an incidental take permit has
been granted under section 10.48 From the perspective of biodiversity conservation,
the most obvious shoncoming of this provision, apart from the narrow species focus,
is that plants are not included. It is only unlawful to damage or destroy plants on
private land where this involves a knowing breach of state law.49
Plants will be protected, however, to the extent that they form the habitat of listed
species of fish or wildlife. For it has been held in decisions by the couns, with one
recent notable exception,50 that significant habitat modification or degradation will

42American Mining Congress v. U.S. Anny Corps of Engineers, CA 93-1754 (D.D.C. Aug. 24,
1993.
4333 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(1)(iii) (1994); 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (1993 as amended at 58 Fed. Reg. 45037).
See generally 58 Fed. Reg. 45,018 (1993).
44united States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
45Hoffman Homes v. EPA, 961 F. 2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1992), reh'g granted, 975 F. 2d 1554 (7th Cir.
1992), decision on reh·g, 999 F. 2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993). The Court. however, found no substantial
evidence to suppon such a finding on the facts of the case.
46cLINTON ADMINlSTRATION PROPOSAL ON PROTECTION OF U.S. WE1LANDS, WHITE
HOUSE OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY Section V C (August 24, 1993), reproduced in
24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 793 (August 1993).
4733 C.F.R. §§ 328.3(a)(8), 323.2(a) (1994): 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (1993 as amended at 58 Fed. Reg.
45038 (1993).
48t6 U.S.C. § I539(a) (1988). The prohibition on takings has been extended to most threatened
species by regulation: 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1988); SO C.F.R. § 17.3I(a) (1993).
49t6 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(B) (1988).
50sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon v. Babbiu, 1 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1994),
decision on reh•g, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), n:h'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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constitute a taking of a species because it amounts to "hann" under the defmition in the
regulations. 51 This potentially constitutes a significant limitation on private land use.
At first sight, the prohibitive commands of these two pieces of legislation look
impressive indeed. Experience teaches us, however, that where the commitment of the
community to a legal obligation is equivocal, as here, where land use regulation in the
interests of environmental conservation clashes with deeply held values about the
sanctity of private propeny, regulatory hernias will inevitably develop as agencies
search for some level of "flexibility" to enable them to survive politically. What
"flexibility" means in practice is allowing projects to go ahead with conditions designed
to mitigate environmental impact attached, as distinct from simply saying "no". At
present the focus of regulatory systems is on how we can manage to allow development
to proceed, not on whether we should allow it to proceed.
This approach may be acceptable when we are addressing the need to prevent land
degradation: for example, the threat of soil erosion can frequently be prevented by
requiring land cleared of native vegetation to be immediately sown with pasture. The
argument is that it will frequently not go far enough where our objective is conservation
of biodiversity. In this context, we may be at the stage where there needs to be a
paradigm shift, so that the question becomes what level of development is compatible
with the conservation of biodiversity, not how can we retain the maximum level of
biodiversity consistent with development.

Regulatory hernias under section 404
We have seen that under section 404 of the Clean Water Act, there has been, for the
most pan, a general movement in the direction of expanding the range of situations
when a permit is needed. But it is one thing to draw the regulatory net wide. It is quite
another to make sure that the holes are small enough to prevent everything slipping
through. The crucial question is how the permit system operates in practice.
Although the Corps of Engineers has its own set of guidelines which it applies when
making decisions, it must also apply the EPA Guidelines, and there has been an
ongoing battle between the two agencies over what they mean. At ftrst sight. a
precautionary approach is built into the decision-making process. The EPA Guidelines
pronounce in clear terms that the aim is to make sure that the activities covered do not
go ahead:
unless it can be demonstrated that such a discharge will not have an
unacceptable adverse impact either individually or in combination with
known and/or probable impacts of other activities affecting the ecosystems
of concern.52
Under the Guidelines, a permit must be refused if there is a practicable alternative
which would have less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem and would not have
other significant adverse environmental consequences.53 Where a project is not waterdependent, the burden of proof is actually reversed, SO• that it is presumed, "unless
clearly demonstrated otherwise," that practicable alternatives not involving wetlands are
available. It is also presumed that all practicable alternatives to discharge into a wetland
will have less adverse impact on the aquatic environment than the discharge for which a
permit is sought.54 On top of this, it has recently been held by the Founh Circuit
Slt6 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1988); 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1993). See, for example, Palila v. Hawaii
Depanment of Land and Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988); Sierra Club v. Reuter, 926
F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991).
Sl40 C.F.R. § 230.1(c) (1993).
5340 C.F.R. § 230.IO(a) (1993).
S44o C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(3) (1993).
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Court of Appeals that even where there are no practicable alternatives available (to
satisfy a community's need for water, for example), the EPA can veto a pennit solely
on the basis of the unacceptability of the adverse environmental impact.55
In spite of these precautionary measures, however, there is sufficient flexibility built
into the permit system to tolerate a good deal of regulatory failure when it comes to
biodiversity conservation.56 One prominent device invented by the Corps to enhance
flexibility, for example, was the "mitigation-buy-down". This allowed lt to take into
account {'TOPOsed compensatory mitigation in reaching the conclusion that because of
the substttution of restored or created wetlands at another site, there was no17racticable
In other
alternatiV.e that would have less adverse affect on the aquatic ecosystem.
words, complete avoidance or minimization of environmental impact were bypassed in
the stampede to facilitate attempts at substitution.
This practice has now been abandoned as a result of a Memorandum of Agreement
between the Corps and the EPA in 1990.58 This commits the Corps to a sequencing
process, whereby compensation of wedand values only becomes available as an option
after potential impacts have been avoided to the maximum extent practicable, and those
which cannot be avoided have been minimized. In spite of this apparent downgrading
of mitigation through compensation, as well as comments in the MOA about the
scientific uncertainty associated with wetland creation, the suspicion must remain that
wetland compensation is going to provide the technological fix and the "flexibility"
which will allow development to proceed in most cases. Provided that avoidance and
minimization have been fully explored, there is a very strong suggestion in the MOA
that the normal course of events will be to give the go-ahead on the basis that loss of
wetland values and functions will be compensated, rather than to refuse a pennit
altogether. The possibility of outright refusal is discussed only in a footnote. 59
This suspicion is reinforced by the Clinton Wetlands Plan of August 1993. This
document is as much about protecting landholders from regulatory burdens as it is
about protecting wetlands from landholders. The emphasis is on flexibility and
compromise. In most situations "the Federal agencies can work with permit applicants
to design projects that meet the requirements of the law and protect the environment and
public safety, while protecting the property rights of the applicant".60 The use of
mitigation banks, comprising wetlands restored or created expressly for the purpose of
providing compensation in the future, is endorsed.6l
It is one thing to espouse the restoration of degraded wetlands, or even the creation of
new ones, as a means of recovering in some small way the values and functions which
have already been lost, with a view to moving toward a long-term goal of increasing
the wetlands resource. It is quite another to advocate restoration and creation as
devices to excuse and legitimate the continued destruction of wetlands in relatively
undisturbed condition. The evidence is that the science of wetland's mitigation is still
55James City County, Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency, 12 F.3d 1330 (4th Cir. 1993).

56see, generally, Oliver A. Houck, Hard Choices: The Analysis of Alternatives Under Section 404 of
the Clean Water Act and Similar Environmental Laws, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 773 (1989).
S7Robert Uram, The Evolution ofthe Practicable Alternatives Test, 7 NR&E 15 (1992).
ssss Fed. Reg. 9210 (1990).
59•tt is important to recognize that there are circumSianccs where the impacts of the project are so
significant that even if alternatives are 110( available, the discharge may not be pennitted regardless of
the compensatory mitigation proposed." 55 Fed. Reg. 9212, noteS (1990).
60CLINTON ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL ON PROTECTION OF U.S. WE11.ANDS, WHITE
HOUSE OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY Section V L (August 24, 1993). reproduced in 24
Env't Rep. (BNA) 793 (August 1993).
61rd. S«:lion v F. .
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in its infancy, and the creation of wetlands substitutes are frequently not successfui.62
Common-sense suggests that some functions of wetlands may be more difficult to
restore or create than others, and that vegetation and habitat would be prominent on this
list.

Regulatory hernias under the Endangered Species Act
The permit system for allowing incidental takes of listed species under the Endangered
Species Act is located in section 10. As under section 404 of the Clean Water Act, the
provisions are fmmed in precautionary tenns, including a requirement that the applicant
must submit a conservation plan which specifies:63
•the likely impact of the taking;
•steps to be taken by the applicant to minimize and mitigate impact;
•funding available to implement such steps;
•procedures to be used to deal with unforeseen circumstances;
•alternative actions to the incidental qtke considered by the applicant. and the
·
reasons why they are not being taken;
•any other measures required.
Rather than placing the burden of devising an adequate conservation strategy on the
agency responsible for deciding whether to issue a permit, and imposing it through
permit conditions, it is placed very firmly on the applicant through the conservation
plan requirement. Before granting a permit, the Secretary of the Interior must be
satisfied that the applicant will minimize and mitigate the impacts of the incidental take
"to the maximum extent rracticable". that adequate funding for the plan will be
provided, and that there wil be procedures to deal with unforeseen circumstances.
In this case, unlike section 404 of the Clean Water Act, the result has in fact been that
the regulatory system has operated quite tightly. Very few conservation plans have
been completed and, as of the beginning of 1994, only twenty-one incidental take
permits have been issued,64 although there is some suggestion that this situation is
gradually changing. However, the legislation has built into it other opportunities for
regulatory slippage, in particular the process by which a species gets on to the list in the
first place.
Under section 404, Congress opted to apply controls directly to an amorphous and illdefined class of wetlands, leading to all the problems of uncertainty associated with
decisions about what constitutes a wetland. Nevertheless, the approach was
precautionary insofar as all areas falling within what has eventually turned out to be an
expansive definition were immediately subject to regulation, regardless of any prior
assessment of their conservation significance through a detailed forward planning
exercise. The approach taken under the Endangered Species Act is very different.
Even though the prohibition on taking species bites like a pit bull when it does bite, the
reality is that its protective bite is very selective. It impacts only on a narrow class of
species which have been identified in advance and listed after a very cautious, careful
and relatively lengthy forward planning exercise. In addressing the potential climate for
regulatory failure which arises under section 404 of the Clean Water Act, stemming
from uncertain coverage and Jack of specific and detailed justification for conservation
in particular instances, the Endangered Species Act produces another hernia in the
regulatory system. This has led to "front-end'' regulatory failure.

62J. A. KUSLER AND M. E. KENTIJLA, WETI..AND CREATION AND RESTORATION: TilE
STATIJS OF THE SCIENCE (Island Press, 1990).
63J6 U.S.C. § 1539(a}(2)(A) (1988}; 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22(b)(l), 17.32(b)(l) (1993).
64Robert Melz, Where the Wild Things Are: The Endangered Sp~cies Act and Private Property, 24
ENVTL. L. 369,382 (1994) citing a FWS source.
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One argument is that because a failure to list may result in an irreversible effect. while a
mistaken decision to list at worse means a delay in a project, it is better to put up with
false positives, rather than false negatives. In other words, if we are dealing with a
situation of potential irreversible loss, we should proceed cautiously and be prepared to
carry out protective action even though the threat to the species concerned cannot be
proved according to traditional cannons of scientific proof. This is neatly encapsulated
in the moderate version of the so-called precautionary principle found in the Preamble
to the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity:
. where there is a threat of significant reduction or loss of biological
-. diversity, lack of full scientific cenainty should not be used as a reason for
postponing measures to avoid or minimize such a threat.
The Endangered Species Act simply requires decisions to be based on the "best
scientific .. . data available .. . after conducting a review of the status of the species".65
It does not address the question of what we do in the face of scientific uncertainty,
where the best scientific data is inconclusive. It does establish a threshold test of
"substantial" evidence to be produced by a petitioner before the Fish and Wildlife
Service must conduct a formal review,66 and this means that where little or no research
has been carried out, a listing proposal wiU not get past first base. When it comes to
the question of the standard of proof which must ultimately be satisfied before a species
is to be listed, however, the legislation is silent. In the absence of a specific indication
that a precautionary approach should be taken during the listing process, "commonsense" would suggest that, as we are clearly in an area of science, traditional cannons
of scientific rigour should apply. This impression is reinforced by the legislation's
provision of a time consuming procedural obstacle course which must be navigated
before a species is listed. Tobin has wrinen:67
In short, the changes since 1966 have altered the burden-of-proof
requirements associated with the listing process . ..•. .. the evidentiary
requirements have multiplied. Decisions are far more technically and
procedurally elegant than they were in the past In contrast, the additional
listing requirements probably reduce the likelihood that many vulnerable
species will receive the benefits of any doubt. When doubt exists or when
sufficient information is unavailable, the existing listing requirements
encourage delay or additional research. Having "sufficient" information is
always desirable, but there never has been enough money to ensure that the
requisite information will be available for all candidate species. As a
consequence, a shortage of resources and the current listing procedures and
their implementation will doom some species to extinction.
From the earlier discussion of mitigation under section 404 of the Clean Waters Act, it
is instructive to recall that when it comes to facilitating the passage of development
proposals through environmental regulatory systems. by allowing wetlands mitigation
through creation and restoration projects, the standards of scientific certainty required
are dramatically downgraded.

If a species is not listed as endangered or threatened because we are inclined to take
risks rather than err on the side of caution, then the precautionary approach embodied in
the permit system for incidental takes amounts to simply shutting the stable door after
the horse has bolted.
·
65t6 U.S.C. § 1533(b){l ){A) (1988); 50 C.P.R. § 424.ll{c) (1993).
6616 U.S.C. § 1533(b}(3XA) (1988).
67RICHARD J. TOBIN, THE EXPENDABLE R.mJRE: U.S. POLmCS AND THE PROTECTION
OF BIOLOGICAL ~IVERSITY 135 (Duke University Press, 1990).
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The effort and time required to produce the level of proof implicit in the listing
provisions of the Endangered Species Act is by no means the only reason why species
do not get listed as threatened or endangered. Even where a decision has been made
that a listing is warranted, its formal processing through the rule-making process can
still be delayed because other pending listing proposals are·seen to be more urgent, and
there are a significant number of species which currently fall into this category.68
Nevertheless, the heavy burden of proof on the listing agency implicit in the time
consuming procedural complexities of the listing process, taken m the context of
inadequate resources, clearly plays a significant role in restricting the number of species
listed, and provides a convenient cover for essentially political arguments against
listing.
Ultimately, these difficulties of scientific proof stem directly from the narrow species
focus on which the legislation rests. How can we, for example, expect to produce
scientific proof of the conservation status of the many invertebrate species not yet
known to science? Yet many of these may be playing vital roles in ecosystems. If the
focus was on threatened and endangered ecosystems, it would be very much easier to
satisfy even a very demanding burden of scientific proof.69 In other words it is
ultimately the level of the environmental unit on which science is expected to focus
rather than the demand that science be allowed to play a role in the decision-making
process which lies at the henn of the problem. To this extent, the flaw in the legislation
is a genetic one. The failure of the Endangered Species Act lies not simply in a failure
of administrative will but in its very structure. This can only be addressed by
fundamental structural changes, involving a reconceptualisation of the problem to focus
on ecosystems rather than individual species.70

Paying compensation?
This analysis of relevant provisions of the Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water
Act raises the whole question of whether command and control regulation used in
isolation can adequately address the issue of biodiversity conservation on privately
owned land. What we need is a policy response which moves away from total reliance
on a coercive approach, and seeks to attract greater cooperation from private
landholders. On the other hand, the earlier analysis of strategies based on volun'tary
agreement between landholders and the public or private sector indicates that parametersetting command and control regulation cannot be abandoned altogether. It is too late to
leave biodiversity conservation to the whims of the marketplace, even where
government is a player.
An alternative strategy involves combining regulation with the provision of
compensation in those situations where controls actually bite. From one perspective,
this is already the position in the United St~tes.71 Under the Fifth Amendment to the
6816 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(iii) (1988); 50 C.F.R. § 424.14(b)(3)(iii) (1993). See the discussion by
Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and its Implementation U, the U. S. Departmeflls of
Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277,285-286 (1993).
69see Malcolm L. Hunter, Coping with Ignorance: The Coarse-Filter Strategy for Maintaining
Biodiversity, in BALANCING ON THE BRINK OF EXTINCTION: TifE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT AND LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 266 (Kathryn A. Kohm, ed., Island Press, 1991).
70sec Cons&ance E. Hunt, Creating an Endangered Ecosystems Act, 6(3&4) ENDANGERED
SPECIES UPDATE 1 (1989).
71 This assumes that the theory of "partial regulatory takings", recently adopted by a majority of the
Federal Circuit Coun of Appeals in Florida Rock Industries. v. U.S. 18 F.3d 1560, 1571-1572 (Fed.
Cir. 1994), rehg denied, 1994 US App. LEXIS 16257 (Fed. Cir. June 21, 1994) over a vigorous
dissent, ultimately prevails. According to this, once a regulatory taking is found to have taken place,
the regulator does not have to purthase the whole fee and take the land in question into the public
domain. Rather, the amount of compensation payable is measured by the loss in value auribu&able to
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Constitution, private land use regulation at a cenain level of impact must be
accompanied by just compensation. But compensation is only available grudgingly, on
an ad hoc basis through the courts, and the outcome is difficult to predict The ultimate
decision will depend on the weighing of factors such as the economic impact of the
regulation on the applicant, panicularly the extent to which it interferes with distinct
investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action.72 The
result is that the regulatory system loses all of the advantages associated with a system
which explicitly provides for some form of financial inducement up front, softening the
blows of the stick by offering an easily grasped carrot.
In Australia, there is no equivalent of the Fifth Amendment in relation to regulatory
takings. -: Environmental and natural resources legislation bearing on private land
emanates primarily from the states, rather than the Commonwealth Parliament. but there
is nothing in any of the state constitutions which guarantees compensation for
landholders, even in situations where they are totally excluded from their land by state
action. The payment of compensation where land is resumed for public purposes is
purely a matter of convention. Section Sl(xxxi) of the Commonwealth Constitution
does provide that any "acquisition" of property by instrumentalities of the
Commonwealth Government must be made on just terms. However, in the Tasmanian
Dam case73, three of the four members of the High Coun who dealt with the issue,
made it clear that even the severe restrictions on land use in Tasmania imposed under
the World Heritage Propenies Conservation Act 198374 did not constitute an
"acquisition" requiring the payment of compensation. According to Mason J, the
Commonwealth had acquired no proprietary interest in the land in question, and
therefore did not have to pay compensation, even though in terms of its potential use
the propeny was sterilized in the same way as a dedicated park, subject only to the
power of the Minister to consent to development on a case by case basis.
The absence of a constitutional guarantee of compensation for regulatory takings in
Australia does not mean that there is no debate about whether compensation should be
paid. It simply means that the primary forum is Parliament rather than the couns. If a
decision is made to pay compensation, it will be the result of a general formula worked
out in the context of particular legislation. This contrasts with the position in the United
States where not only the question of the amount payable, but the prior issue of
whether compensation should be paid at all. is addressed through case by case
decisions, made ultimately by the highest court in the land after hearing argument from
some of the highest paid lawyers.
Having said this, provision for compensation is rarely made in Australian land use
legislation. At one stage, there was one significant exception to this of particular
relevance to biodiversity conservation. The South Australian Native Vegetation
Management Act 1985 prohibited land clearing and woodcutting on private land without
consent from the Native Vegetation Authority, subject to a number of exemptions,
including grazing by domestic stock and clearance of regrowth and shrub invasion in
the regulation, and the landowner is left in possession of the land. If, on lhe olher hand, lhe Fiflh
Amendment effectively forces governments to lake land into the public domain, lhen it would,
necessarily, cease to be relevant as a rJSCal instrument for encouraging sensitive management of land in
private hands.
72pCM Central Transportation Co. v New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-125 (1978); Connolly v.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 475 U.S. 211, 224-225 (1986). After Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council 112 S.CL 2886 (1993), we can at least be certain lhat there is a taking when
regulation deprives a landowner of all economically beneficial or productive use of the land in question.
unless the proposed use falls foul of background principles of nuisance or propeny law. But this
situation is lilcely to be exceptional.
73eommonwealth v. Tasmania, 158 CLR 1 (1983) .
74AUSTI.. ACTS P. No. 5 of 1983.

17
certain carefully defined circumstances. Where an activity was not exempt, owners of
land who were given a conditional approval or were refused consent, could generally
insist on the Minister entering into a heritage agreement, and once this had been
concluded, the landholder was entitled to the payment of "a sum of money" based on
diminution in the market value of the land. The most notable effect of this approach
was a significant tightening up in terms of the granting of permits. Of the total area for
which applications were made between 1986 and 1989 involving broadacre clearing,
about 94% was protected by outright refusals. Under the previous command and
control regime, 80% of applications received approvals.75
This suggests that the availability of some form of recompense may make it easier for
regulatory agencies to say "no" to development. The hypothesis might be that they are
less likely to search for the "flexibility" which they have managed to find in the
provisions of the Endangered Species Act and the Clean Warer Act when they are in a
position to soften the blow of outright refusal by offering something in return. This
will reduce the risk of regulatory failure in terms of achieving biodiversity conservation
goals.
In addition, the availability of a financial return in some shape or size will inevitably
make landholders less hostile to regulation and make enforcement of land use
restrictions easier. Besides, land use restrictions are only the first step in conserving
biodiversity. Ongoing management is usually needed because ecosystems have been
disturbed and are out of balance. They require human management to suslain them.
When we are dealing with remnants threatened by external influences, this will have to
be quite aclive. The reality is that disgruntled landholders will make poor land
managers.
The issue, therefore, is not whether landholders should receive some form of financial
payment in conjunction with command and control regulation, but what fonn that
payment should lake. By paying full compensation we actually put some landholders
in a better position by negating the elemenl of risk frequently associated with
development, particularly agricultural activities. By paying compensation, we allow
landholders to externalize the problem and deny that they have any responsibility for the
conservation of biodiversity. Compensation is backward-looking and has nothing to
say about the matter of future management of the land. Instead of landholders being
given some degree of ownership of the issue of biodiversity conservation and a real
stake in addressing it, we allow them to wash their hands of it.
To this the traditional response is that landholders who have land development .
proposals baulked are being treated inequitably in that they are being asked in effect to

provide a benefit to the community at a cost to themselves. They should therefore be
compensated.
Traditionally, it is aue that the expectation has been that the state should pay for nature
conservation on privately owned land through the purchase of land use restrictions or
title to the land itself. Unlike pollution control where command and control regulation
is regarded as legitimate, and where it is now widely accepted that the polluter must
pay, the conservation of nature on privately owned land was a benefit provided by the
landholder rather than a harm prevented. This led to a cenain grey area where one of
the objectives of retention of vegetation was the prevention of land degradation and
non-source pollution, rather than nature conservation per se, but in practice society has
had few problem~. in fudging the similarities between this and industrial pollution and
avoiding any discussion of polluter pays in the context of land conservation. Indeed,

7Ssee David Farrier, Rtgulation of Rural lAnd Ust: Cotrcwn or Constnsus? 2 CURRENT ISSUES
IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 95, 102·103 (1990).
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we have been much more inclined to pay for land conservation than to regulate the
forces leading to land degradation or to make the polluter pay.
It is now increasingly recognized that, when it comes to land use policy, there is no
value-free basis for distinguishing between preventing harm to other members of
society and conferring a benefit on them • that the distinction lies in the eyes of the
beholder.76 At the same time, the concept of nature conservation has undergone
substantial changes. The soft aesthetic and recreational values with which it has been
historically associated are now in the process of being replaced by much harder
resource values. Increasingly when we talk about the values of biodiversity, we are
talking about life-support rather than life-style. Viiewed in this context, it is easier to
see biodiversity conservation in tenns of the prevention of harm, which must be
regulated or paid for, ~ather than the provision of a benefit
It may well be, however, that a crucial distinction ought to be drawn between
regulations which prevent landholders from continuing existing uses, such as grazing
or hunting, and those which merely interfere with speculative uses, such as real estate
development. The approach traditionally taken in land use legislation has been to
exclude existing uses from new regulations77 (although the "take" provisions of the
Endangered Species Act represents a significant exception to this). Where the
conservation of biodiversity demands that an existing operation be shut down
altogether, there is a strong argument that compensation should be paid/or the loss of
that operation . The disruption to lifestyle and expectations involved in tenninating an
existing activity is of a fundamentally different nature to the disappointment stemming
from a lost opportunity to make speculative gain. To those who would counter that
speculators may lose the premium that they have paid for land based on its development
value, the response must be that the market will quickly adjust and factor into real estate
prices what would become a significant risk that development will be restricted because
of biodiversity considerations.
Even if the payment of compensation is conceded where constraints are placed on
existing uses, there is a strong argument that, in determining the amount, the private
benefit foregone, in terms of loss of market value, should be discounted to take into
account the public costs which have been avoided by tenninating an existing use (in
terms, for example, of prevention of pollution and loss of biodiversity). This is simply
an extrapolation of the polluter pays principle. As increasing recognition is given to the
hidden subsidies represented by the currently unpaid for public costs resulting from
activities carried out for private gain, and regulatory legislation moves towards adopting
the principle of polluter pays, it will inevitably be reflected in adjustme~ts to market
values. In the interim, it is important to emphasize that the United States Constitution
talks about "just compensation", not market value.

Paying for management
The Supreme Coun has recently concluded in Lucas v. South Carolina78 that
compensation is payable under the Futh Amendment where land use regulations such
as those designed to conserve biodiversity deprive a landholder of all economically
beneficial or productive use of the land in question. This situation would simply not
arise if government was prepared to pay landholders to manage land for the purposes of
76see, Cor example, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2897·2899 (1m):
Frank I. Micbelman, Property. Utility, and Fairness: Comments on tM Ethiapl Foundations of "Just
Compensationu Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1196-1200 (1967) Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights
and tM Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 1433, 1452 (1993).
77see, for example, ROBERT R. WRIGHT AND MORTON GITELMAN, LAND USE: CASES
AND MATERIALS 873·892 (West's, :fth ed., 1991).
78112 S. Ct.-2886 (1992).
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biodiversity conservation, thereby supporting an alternative land use. Arguments based
on economic hardship are also addressed if management payments are available.
Indeed so far as some farmers are concerned, payments can be depicted as a response
to existing hardship arising from low commodity prices.
Unlike compensation, management or stewardship payments are forward-looking and
are based on work carried out by the landholder rather than the market value of the
land. They are more equitable than compensation insofar as they constitute payment for
work performed, as opposed to being based on what are frequently chance factors
relating to the development value of land. A strategy which offers management
payments to landholders will be particularly appropriate in situations where the
conservation of remnant vegetation is at stake, and agricultural landholders want to
remain on the land, even though their existing operations·are marginal. Remnants will
ordinarily require more intensive management than larger areas because of the impact of
external spillovers. Management must take into account the singularities of each piece
of land in light of the complexity of ecosystems and the fact that our current knowledge
is very limited. From this perspective, building on to the knowledge base of individual
landholders, advised and supported by the expertise of government, might prove to be
a more efficient strategy than handing over complete management responsibility of
scattered patches to government agencies. It eff~ti.vely gives greater ownership of the
issue of biodiversity conservation to those landholders who already have an ongoing
relationship with the land.
Apart from this, paying farmers and pastoralists on marginal land to manage it for
biodiversity conservation would currently be a very attractive political proposition. The
approach will work best where the main objective of landholders is to remain on the
land, and it is social policy to sustain them, even though their existing operations are
economically marginal. It provides an alternative form of income support to
agricultural price support schemes. Society is simply subsidizing the production of
bicxliversity as an alternative commodity.

